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  Although government expansion of health insurance to older workers leads to labor 
supply reductions for recipients, there may be spillover effects on the labor supply of affected 
spouses who are not covered by the programs.  In the simplest model, health insurance on the 
job is paid for in terms of lower compensation on the job.  Receiving health insurance 
exogenous to employment is akin to a positive income shock for the household, causing total 
household labor supply to drop.  However, it is not clear within the household whether this 
decrease in labor supply will be borne by both spouses or by a specific spouse.  We use a 
mid-1990s expansion of health insurance for U.S. veterans to provide evidence on the effects of 
expanding health insurance availability on the labor supply of spouses.  Using data from the 
Current Population Survey, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to compare the labor 
market behavior of the wives of older male veterans and non-veterans before and after the VA 
health benefits expansion to test the impact of public health insurance on these spouses.  Our 
findings suggest that although household labor supply may decrease because of the income 
effect, the more flexible labor supply of wives allows the wife’s labor supply to increase, 
particularly for those with lower education levels.   
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I.  Introduction 
As access to public health insurance increases, it is important to consider 
the  impact  of  publicly-provided  care  on  household  labor.  For  workers 
approaching the age of retirement, it is particularly important to consider how 
public insurance expansions will alter the retirement and work decisions of the 
household. From previous work (Boyle and Lahey 2010), we know that for men 
between the ages of 55 and 64, the probability of leaving the labor force increases 
3.33% upon receipt of government-provided health insurance.  However, although 
government  expansion  of  health  insurance  to  older  workers  decreases  labor 
supply for those workers, there may be positive or negative spillover effects on 
the labor supply of affected spouses who are not covered by the programs.   
The  effect  of  publicly-provided  healthcare  receipt  on  a  spouse’s  labor 
supply is not theoretically clear cut.  There are several factors that are important 
to consider.  In theory, household labor supply should decrease with the effective 
income  shock  from  publicly-provided  health  insurance,  but  that  labor  supply 
reduction may not be borne equally by all members of the household.  Because 
older wives generally have more flexible work options than their husbands, they 
may  increase  their  work  hours  or  enter  the  labor  force  part  time  once  their 
husbands drop out of the labor force.  If a husband’s job has provided health 
insurance for his wife and he is offered public health insurance for himself, it may 
make sense for the wife to seek or retain employment options that allow her to 3 
 
acquire her own employer-provided insurance, such as by increasing her hours to 
full-time or obtaining a new job with health insurance coverage.  On the other 
hand,  husbands  and  wives  may  make  joint  retirement  decisions,  which  would 
increase the attractiveness of reducing hours for wives (Coile 2004).    
Previous research that has examined the effect of health insurance receipt 
on spousal labor supply has generally found negative effects of husbands’ health 
insurance  availability  on  wives’  labor  supply  (Abraham  and  Royalty  2006, 
Buchmueller  and  Valletta  1999,  Kapinos  2009,  Murasko  2008,  Olson  1998).  
However, this research focuses on the effect of health insurance availability that 
can cover the entire  family and not  just the plan participant.    The theoretical 
implications  of  this  type  of  policy  change,  similar  to  extending  COBRA  or 
providing universal healthcare, are different than for a policy which only covers 
one specific member of the household.  In these previously studied cases, the wife 
will have less of an incentive to increase labor supply (even when her husband 
previously provided the family’s health insurance) because she will not need to 
provide health insurance for the family.  Additionally, this literature tends to focus 
on younger age groups, who may be more attached to the labor force than those 
ages  55  and  older.  Some  of  this  literature  also  has  problems  with  positive 
marriage selection—“high quality” husbands are more likely to have both health 
insurance  and  “high  quality”  wives  with  their  own  labor  force  attachment.  
However, the main findings still hold even when this endogeneity is corrected for 4 
 
in more recent work (Kapinos 2009).  A related literature finds that when SCHIP 
or  Medicaid  becomes  available  to  children,  women  reduce  their  labor  supply.  
However,  this  type  of  health  insurance  directly  disincentivizes  work  through 
eligibility requirements (e.g. Montgomery and Navin 2000, Tomohara and Lee 
2007, Winkler 1991, Yelowitz 1995). 
In contrast, we examine the effect of a health benefits increase that is not 
linked to work and only covers the individual affected, not the entire family.  We 
use  a  mid-1990s  expansion  of  health  insurance  for  U.S.  veterans  to  provide 
evidence on the effects of expanding health insurance availability on the labor 
supply of wives of affected veterans.  Using data from the Current Population 
Survey,  we  employ  a  difference-in-differences  strategy  to  compare  the  labor 
market behavior of the wives of older veterans and non-veterans before and after 
the VA health benefits expansion to test the impact of public health insurance on 
these spouses.  This experiment models the potential impact on women’s labor 
supply if the husband reaches the age of Medicare eligibility earlier than his wife.  
Because  wives  in  these  cohorts  are  generally  younger  than  their  husbands,  a 
husband’s  acquisition  of  VA  coverage  creates  a  situation  analogous  to  a 
household in which the husband reaches the age of Medicare eligibility before his 
wife does.   5 
 
Our findings suggest that although household labor supply may decrease 
because of the income effect, the more flexible labor supply of wives allows the 
wife’s labor supply to increase.  This effect appears to dominate the propensity for 
a wife to retire at the same time as her husband (which would imply a decrease in 
work on the extensive margin).  This outcome is stronger for wives with high 
school education or less who are more likely than more educated women to seek 
occupations with flexible work hours.  When husbands obtain health insurance 
independent of their jobs, wives with lower levels of education are more likely to 
enter the labor force.  Although women with more education do not significantly 
increase their propensity to  work on the extensive margin,  they increase their 
earnings and hours worked, suggesting an increase on the intensive margin.      
The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section II describes the VA 
program.  Section III gives a brief overview of the theoretical framework and the 
data.  Section IV provides results.  Section V discusses and concludes. 
 
II.  Description of VA Program 
The  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs  (VA)  health  care  system  was 
established  in  the  1930s  to  treat  veterans  with  conditions  resulting  from  their 
military service,  and later, low-income veterans.   Prior to  the time period  we 
study,  VA  primarily  provided  inpatient  care,  and  limited  the  availability  of 6 
 
outpatient care for non-service-connected conditions to follow-up visits after an 
inpatient stay.
1 
  The U.S. government began a major overhaul of this health care system in 
the mid-1990s.  The impetus was an effort to catch up with progress in technology 
and efficiency in  private-sector medicine.  During this time, VA health care 
restructured  to  become  a comprehensive health care system  that  focused  on 
primary  care  and  preventive  medic ine  rather  than  hospital -based  specialty 
services.   Following this change, VA experienced a  44 percent decline in the 
number of inpatients and a 66 percent increase in the total number of outpatient 
visits  (Klein and Stockford 2001).   At  the same  time, VA  also  changed  its 
resource allocation system by distributing its health care budget using a capitated, 
patient-based formula, similar to  the  HMO model.
2  VA  expected that these 
changes would result in significant cost reductions. Based on this assumption,  it 
relaxed its rules on eligibility for care and offered services to all veterans rather 
than limiting  guaranteed access to low-income  and service-connected disabled 
veterans (GAO 1999).   
Veterans were required to fill out paperwork enrolling in the VA program 
before they could use health care services.  However, it is important to note that 
                                                           
1 For additional detail on VA health care and the associated reforms, see Boyle (2009). 
2 In a capitated payment system, the health care provider is reimbursed a flat dollar amount for 
each patient regardless of the services provided. 7 
 
veterans could enroll without utilizing VA health care, but enrollment guaranteed 
the ability to use VA services in the future.  Additionally, during the time period 
of our study, not enrolling did not imply that veterans would not be able to fill out 
paperwork and enroll in the future should they need VA services.  In that respect, 
VA  functioned  as  insurance  for  veterans  even  in  the  absence  of  enrollment, 
similar to the way that COBRA serves as insurance for the first 60 days after job 
separation  regardless  of  whether  the  job  leaver  chooses  to  pay  a  premium.  
Nevertheless, 6.6 million veterans had enrolled by 2002 and VA’s patient load 
had increased from 2.6 million veterans in 1995 to 4.3 million in 2002 (GAO 
1996, GAO 2003).
3   
During our study period, enrolled veterans  were sorted into one of seven 
priority groups.  Those with service-related conditions resulting in disability of 50 
percent or higher were considered th e highest priority for treatment  and were 
placed in group one.  Those with incomes above VA determined thresholds and 
no service-connected disabilities were considered the lowest priority and placed in 
group seven.   Priority groups 1-6 consisted of  previously-eligible veterans and 
care remained free for  them.   Group 7 veterans were n ewly-eligible and were 
charged modest copayments.
4  The priority groups were used only for enrollment 
                                                           
3 Prior to the reorganization, there was no formal enrollment system, so we cannot examine 
changes in enrollment, only changes in users. 
4 The copay was $2 for each prescription for a 30-day supply in 2001 and $7 in 2002.  In 2002, 
copays for outpatient visits were $15 for primary care, and $50 for specialty care outpatient visits 8 
 
purposes and determination of copays during the time period of our study. For all 
enrollees, routine care appointments were provided on a first-come first-served 
basis regardless of group.
5  
The  VA  restructuring  affected  the  availability  of  health  care  for  all 
veterans.  For those not previously eligible, the policy introduced a form of non-
employer-provided health insurance.  For the previously-eligible (i.e., low-income 
or disabled),  it represented an increase in the scope of health care and health 
insurance, similar to what is available in the private sector.  Therefore, this change 
provides an exogenous introduction of an outside health insurance option for  all 
U.S. veterans but not for non-veterans.  In order to estimate  the spillover effect 
from  publicly provided health insurance on  spousal  labor supply choices we 
compare the labor supply outcomes of wives of veterans to those of non-veterans 
before and after the change. 
Previous research indicates that v eterans used this health insurance to 
leave full-time employment.  Between 35 and 70 percent of new VA health care 
users are individuals who drop private health insurance plans, potentially because 
they are leaving full-time work (Boyle 2009).  In response to the policy change, 
                                                                                                                                                               
such as outpatient surgery, audiology and optometry and so on.  Preventive care, including flu 
shots, hepatitis C screenings, radiology services, electrocardiograms, and so on, was free. 
(Department of Veterans Affairs, 2002a) 
5 The priority groups did not receive differential access to care during the years of our study.  
However, in 2003, budget pressures caused the VA to deny care to the lowest-priority group - 
non-disabled non-poor veterans not previously enrolled in the system).  9 
 
Boyle and Lahey (2010) find a 3.3% increase in the probability that a veteran 
leaves the labor force and an 8.4% decrease in the probability that a veteran works 
full  time  although  some  disadvantaged  groups  appear  to  increase  their  labor 
supply. 
 
III.  Theory, Data, and Empirics 
A.  Theory  
In the simplest model, health insurance on the job is paid for in terms of 
lower  compensation  on  the  job.    Receiving  health  insurance  exogenous  to 
employment is therefore akin to a positive income shock for the household.  In 
this model, there is an income effect which dictates that household labor supply 
will drop.   
However, it is not clear within the household  whether this decrease in 
labor supply will be borne by both spouses or by a specific spouse.  Boyle and 
Lahey (2010) find that husbands’ labor supply drops upon receipt of public health 
insurance, but they do not explore the spillover effects on spousal labor supply.  
Because wives in these cohorts are more likely than their husbands to have jobs 
with flexible hours, it is possible that a wife’s hours may rise when a husband 
leaves a traditional 40-50 hour a week job, although the income effect would 
dictate  that  total  family  labor  supply  would  decrease.  If  a  woman  had  been 10 
 
receiving health insurance through her husband’s job  but  he has  been  offered 
public  health  insurance,  it  may  make  sense  for  the  wife  to  seek  employment 
options that enable her to obtain her own employer-provided insurance, such as 
by increasing her hours to full-time or obtaining a new job with health insurance 
coverage.  Alternatively, she might increase her work hours or seek a higher-
paying  position  in  order  to  pay  for  her  own  health  insurance  out-of-pocket. 
Therefore,  we  would  expect  to  see  a  larger  positive  effect  on  labor  market 
outcomes for women who did not have employer-provided health insurance of 
their own in the previous year.  
On the other hand, because retirement is often a joint decision, we might 
also expect a woman’s labor force participation to decrease when her husband’s 
decreases.  Because of potential complementarity of spousal leisure, the value of 
the  wife’s  leisure  time  may  increase  when  her  husband  retires.
6  Therefore a 
husband’s receipt of insurance would correspond to decreased work outcomes for 
the wife as well. 
Results may also vary by education because of the different opportunities 
that are available for women of differing education levels. For example, women 
with less education may be better able than more educated women to control their 
                                                           
6 See Coile 2004 for a discussion of this with respect to Social Security and private pension 
receipt. 11 
 
job hours on the intensive margin, adding more hours to a part-time job.  Women 
with more education may be more likely to retain or obtain full-time employment. 
 
B.   Data 
This study uses data for the years 1992 through 2002 from the Census 
Bureau’s March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS includes consistent 
information on employment and demographic controls, including veteran status, 
at  an  annual  level  for  these  years.    Using  a  difference-in-differences  (DD) 
estimation strategy, we compare the labor supply choices of wives of veterans and 
wives of non-veterans before and after the restructuring of VA health care.  We 
thus limit our sample to married couples.  Because we are mimicking the effects 
of a public insurance expansion for those approaching the current age of Medicare 
eligibility, we focus on individuals approaching retirement by limiting the sample 
to individuals ages 55 through 64.
7  Additionally, because of the small number of 
female veterans in this age cohort we restrict our  veteran sample to include only 
males.  We delete from our sample couples for which the wife is a veteran , as 
these wives will be directly affected by the treatment.
8  With these restrictions, the 
                                                           
7 Medicare eligibility at age 65 affects the impact of other public health insurance on the work 
decision, so we do not include those ages.  In general, we find that the significance of results is 
slightly stronger if we limit to those age 50-64 rather than 55-64, possibly because of a larger 
sample size. 
8 We also delete the two observations for which the wife is under the age of 18.  The results are 
nearly identical when these are not deleted.  We have also run regressions limiting wife ages to 45-12 
 
treated population is therefore the wives of married male veterans ages 55 to 64, 
and the control group is the wives of married male non-veterans in the same age 
group.  We define 1992-1995 as the pre-policy period and 1998-2002 as the post-
policy period because changes in the VA health care were rolled out during 1996 
and 1997.
9   
The CPS allows us to study labor market outcomes   on the extensive 
margin such as labor force or employment exit, and on the intensive margin, such 
as hours worked,  or  movement into part-time work.  It further allows us to 
examine earnings, although the universe for which we can study  current earnings 
outcomes is limited during this time period, and type of labor force participation, 
such as self-employment. We are also able to examine the effects for different 
demographic groups, such as by education.
 10 
 
C.  Main Specification 
                                                                                                                                                               
64, 50-64, and 55-64.  In general these results are qualitatively the same as our main results.  
Quantitatively, Table 3 results on work outcomes are slightly larger in magnitude and significance 
for these subsets (Table 7, Panel I provides some results) and Table 4 results are quantitatively 
similar. 
9  We end our study period in 2002 because VA revised the rules for obtaining health care January 
2003.  We have also estimated our regressions restricting our post-period to 1998-2001 because of 
a concern that particular Vietnam Era veterans are affected by a 2002 change that categorized 
diabetes as a war-related injury for veterans who may have been exposed to Agent Orange 
(Duggan et al. 2010, Autor and Duggan 2007).  Results are qualitatively almost identical and 
significance increases in some regressions when we remove 2002 from our sample.  Table 7, Panel 
III provides these results. 
10 Results by VA means-tested status are very similar to those by education level and are therefore 
not included. 13 
 
  We use a probit model to estimate the following equation: 
(1)  yi =  0 +  1veteran +  2veteran*post +X' 3+ δt + ζs + ζst + ε  
 
The various dependent variables, yi, include indicators for wives’ labor 
supply  outcomes  including  not  working,  self-employed,  working  part-time 
conditional  on  working,  hours  worked  last  week,  weekly  hours  worked 
conditional on working any hours, weekly earnings, and ln(weekly earnings).
11  
The variable not working is 0 if the wife is employed and 1 otherwise.  The part-
time variable reported is coded as 1 if the number of weekly hours worked is 
between 0 and 35 hours, and 0 if the individual works more than 35 hours. Self-
employed is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the class of worker is self-employed 
(either incorporated or not incorporated) and 0 otherwise. 
Among the independent variables, veteran is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
husband  has  been  honorably  discharged  from  active  military  duty,  post  is  a 
dummy equal to 1 in the post-policy period, X is a vector of the wife’s individual 
characteristics  including  age,  race,  education,  and  indicators  for  employer-
                                                           
11 Weekly earnings are earnings during a usual work week.  This question is limited only to 
respondents in their fourth and eighth months of the survey, greatly reducing sample size.  For the 
weekly earnings outcomes we code respondents in these months who did not have positive 
earnings as having zero earnings. Hourly earnings are constructed from weekly earnings and are 
available from the authors.  We present weekly earnings because the results for hourly wages are 
similar to those for weekly earnings but, as a created variable, introduce more measurement error, 
and it is more problematic dealing with top-coding.  Direct hourly earnings are available only for 
the subset of the sample that earns an hourly wage. 14 
 
provided health insurance and pensions in the previous or current year (including 
codes of 0 for those not employed) and δt is a full set of year dummies while ζs is 
a full set of state dummies and ζst is a state-specific time trend.  State dummies 
and year dummies account for heterogeneity in veteran take-up by state and time; 
this  heterogeneity  could  be  caused  by  local  economic  conditions  making  the 
program  more  attractive or variation in  the degree to  which the program  was 
publicized to veterans in different regions.  A state-specific time trend accounts 
for  factors  varying  within  states  linearly  over  time  in  some  specifications.  
Because the propensity for separating from the labor force will vary with benefits 
offered, we include indicators for employer-provided health insurance coverage 
and  inclusion  in  a  pension  plan  in  the  previous  year  in  some  specifications.
  
Standard  errors  are  adjusted  for  non-independence  of  the  errors  within  the 
veteran*year group.   
 
D.  Identification assumptions 
In  a  difference-in-differences  model,  in  order  to  interpret  the  results 
causally, specific assumptions must be satisfied.  In our quasi-experimental setup, 
it must be true that:  (1) wives of veterans and non-veterans are reasonably similar 
before  the  healthcare  expansion,  (2)  only  veterans  are  affected  by  the  VA 
expansion, (3) no other shocks occur during this time period that differentially 15 
 
affect household labor supply choices, and (4) that the two populations would not 
trend differentially in the absence of a policy change due to unobservable factors.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics demonstrating that the veteran and 
non-veteran samples are reasonably comparable in the pre-period.  The average 
veteran is more educated, and slightly more likely to have employer-provided 
health  insurance  than  the  average  non-veteran.  As  would  be  expected  with 
assortative  mating,  wives  of  veterans  are  also  somewhat  more  educated  than 
wives of non-veterans.  Because wives of veterans are slightly older than wives of 
non-veterans in the pre-period, and the age composition of veterans compared to 
non-veterans is changing over time, it is important to include controls for wife’s 
age in all specifications. Wives of veterans are more likely to be not working than 
those of non-veterans in the pre-period sample.  National Health Interview Survey 
calculations available in Boyle and Lahey (2010) demonstrate that there are no 
differences in health between veterans and non-veterans in the pre-period for the 
cohorts examined in this study.
  
  Assumption (2) is valid because non-veterans and their spouses were not 
affected by the VA insurance expansion.  Although some veterans already had 
access to VA health insurance, it was much less comprehensive than the coverage 
post-expansion, so those individuals are still substantially impacted by the change.  
Using textbook definitions of insurance, veterans were insured once VA coverage 16 
 
was offered (whether or not they formally enrolled) because they could sign up at 
any  time  if  coverage  was  needed.  Therefore  even  if  they  were  not  formally 
insured, they were insured in an economic sense, and thus were treated in the first 
stage.  However, if some veterans were unaware of the insurance, our results will 
provide an underestimate of the behavioral effect of full government coverage.
 12   
The  third  assumption  would  be  violated  if  something  else  besides  this 
expansion affects veterans and non-veterans or their wives differentially.  Policy 
changes in 1996-1997 such as welfare reform are unlikely to affect older male 
veterans and their wives differently than older male non-veterans and their wives.  
Finally,  unobserved  systematic  differences  between  the  treatment  and  control 
groups  could  cause  the  treatment  and  control  to  trend  differently  in  the  post-
period.  However, we find no evidence of pre-existing trends using pre-policy 
years as a falsification exercise.  Additionally, results are very similar when the 
model is fully interacted with veteran.  
 
IV.   Results 
First, we demonstrate that the VA expansion had a direct negative effect 
on the labor supply of married men.  Table 2, Panel I provides the effects from 
                                                           
12 According to a 2001 survey, 22% of unenrolled veterans said they were unaware of the program 
(Department of Veterans Affairs, 2002b). 17 
 
estimating  equation  (1)  on  outcomes  for  married  men  only  using  the  men’s 
characteristics as controls.
13  Veterans are more likely than the control group to be 
not working after receiving VA health insurance, with a significant coefficient of 
0.008 points once a full set of controls  is added, a 2.3% increase relative to the 
pre-period veteran average of 0.35.  Veterans also increase part-time work with 
significant coefficients of  0.016 points in both specifications , an increase of 
15.8% relative to the pre-period.  Table 2, Panel II, provides a robustness check 
for these results, demonstrating that there is not a pre-trend by cutting the universe 
to only include pre-period data and creating a “fake post” variable that is 1 for 
1994-1995 and 0 for 1992-1993.  As would be expected if there was not a pre-
trend,  results  are  not  significant,  and  indeed,  are  opposite-signed  for  the  not 
working outcome. 
Having  demonstrated  that  the  VA  expansion  decreased  married  men’s 
labor supply, we turn to the spillover effects of this coverage on their wives who 
are  not  eligible  to  use  VA  health  care.    First,  we  test  the  effects  of  public 
insurance on wives’ labor supply on the extensive margin. As shown in Table 3, 
                                                           
13 These results differ slightly from those in Boyle and Lahey (2010) because the universe for that 
exercise included single men (who are shown to be more likely to leave the labor market than 
married men after receiving health insurance) and, in order to be consistent with the previous job-
lock literature, limited to men who were working in the previous year.  We do not condition on 
previous employment to examine the spillover effects on spouses.   Additionally, in Boyle and 
Lahey (2010) we included industry and occupation controls in the set of full controls, but in our 
regressions with wife outcomes, the small size of some of these cells causes observations to drop 
out in the probit specifications, potentially resulting in selection biases.  Results are nearly 
identical for the men and qualitatively similar for the women results with these controls included. 18 
 
Panel I, columns (1) and (2), we find that wives are between 1 and 2 ppt less 
likely to be not working once their husbands receive VA insurance. This implies a 
3-4% increase in the probability of working relative to the pre-period average of 
0.473,  although  once  full  controls  are  added  this  effect  is  only  marginally 
significant.  These results appear to be driven by wives with high school or less 
education, as demonstrated in Table 3, Panel II, columns (1) and (2). Women with 
high school education or less are 3 ppt more likely (a 5.6% increase off a base of 
0.53) to work when their husbands are offered VA insurance. Coefficients are 
smaller, insignificant, and change signs when full controls are added, for women 
with at least some college education as shown in Tables 3, Panel III, columns (1) 
and (2).  Similarly, we find in Table 3, Panel I, columns (3) and (4) that average 
hours worked per week for all women increases by approximately half an hour 
(between 0.44 and 0.63 hours).  When hours worked are examined by women’s 
education level, women with a high school education or less in Table 3, Panel II, 
columns (3) and (4), work 0.6 to 0.8 hours more per week when their husbands 
are offered health insurance, while results in Table 3, Panel III, columns (3) and 
(4) are positive but insignificant for those with more education.  We proxy for 
work on the intensive margin with weekly hours worked and weekly earnings 
conditional  on  working  any  hours  or  having  non-zero  earnings  respectively  
However,  conditional  on  working  any  hours,  hours  worked  do  not  increase 19 
 
significantly  and  the  magnitudes  are  smaller,  suggesting  that  the  increase  is 
primarily on the extensive margin. 
In  Table  4  we  examine  the  effect  on  women’s  wages  using  a  tobit 
regression  that  adjusts  for  topcoding.
14  Unfortunately,  the question of usual 
weekly wages was only asked to two of the CPS rotation groups, and sample sizes 
for this variable are thus much smaller than for the other outcome measures. The 
coefficients of interest are not statistically significant as shown in columns (1) and 
(2).   However,  log weekly earnings in Table  4, Panel I, colu mns (3) and (4) 
increase for all women (a 6% to 8% change in wages) and are somewhat larger 
(an 11-16% change in wages compared to  8-9%) for more educated women  
(Table 4,  Panel III, columns (3) and (4)) than for less educated (Tables 4, Panel 
II, columns (3) and (4)).  Because increases in weekly earnings may result from 
increased  hours worked  and /or  increased  wages  (which may  be  affected by 
choices in benefits), we are reluctant to put too much theoretical emphasis on the 
earnings results. 
Women who had health insurance coverage from their employers prior 
to the policy implementation may be more likely to stay employed than those who 
did not in order to keep that coverage.  However, women who did not have their 
own health insurance coverage may need to earn more money to self-insure if 
                                                           
14 Results trimming the top 5% of wages in an OLS regression framework are very similar. 20 
 
they lose their husbands’ coverage, or may seek jobs with employer-provided 
insurance.  Results in Table 5 Panel I demonstrate that women with health 
insurance in the previous year are 2.2 ppt less likely to be not working, a 4.6% 
decrease off the base of 0.47, but 1.8 ppt more likely to work part-time when their 
husbands get health insurance, a 6.4% increase off the base of 0.28 for all wives 
of veterans in the pre-period, and a 4% increase off the base of 0.43 for wives 
with prior health insurance.  Women without health insurance in the previous year 
are less likely to be not working, but not significantly so and are 4.1 ppt less likely 
to be part-time, a 14.4% decrease off the base of all wives and a 32% decrease off 
the base of 0.13 for wives without health insurance in the previous period.  As 
shown in Table 5, Panel II, for women with employer-provided health insurance, 
hours do not change significantly overall but decrease significantly conditional on 
working at all with a coefficient of -0.59.  For women without their own health 
insurance in the previous year, hours increase significantly overall, with a 
coefficient of 0.77, and increase conditional on working any hours with a 
coefficient of 1.08.  Earnings increase significantly for women without employer-
provided health insurance both conditional on having any earnings and 
unconditional, but are not significant for women with health insurance.  These 
results suggest that women with health insurance are more likely to stay employed 21 
 
but are not as focused on additional earnings, whereas women without health 
insurance increase their hours and earnings, possibly to afford health costs.
15   
We also look at the transitions that these wives make as a result of the 
change in their husbands’ health insurance availability.  Table 6 reports marginal 
effects from multinomial logit regressions that examine transitions into and out of 
not working, full- and part-time work and self-employment.  Panel I replicates our 
main regression in a multinomial logit framework for all wives in our sample (i.e. 
not conditioning on the wife’s labor force experiences in the previous year).  
Consistent with the main results, not working outcomes decrease about 1.95 ppt, 
and much of this decrease appears to be women increasing their full-time labor 
force participation.  However, these transitions are different for women who were 
unattached to the labor force in the previous period.  Panel II limits our sample to 
women who were not working at all in the previous year.  These individuals are 
more likely to enter the labor force upon the husbands’ receipt of VA insurance, 
and they appear to predominately enter part-time work for an employer or self-
employment.  Women who worked part-time in the previous year, on the other 
hand, as shown in Panel III, do not change their labor force attachment, but 
instead work more hours, moving from part-time work into full-time work.  This 
transition potentially makes them eligible for employer-provided health insurance 
                                                           
15 These results should be interpreted with some degree of caution, as the Current Population 
Survey variables for health insurance may not be reliable or consistent during these years (Fronstin 
2000, Nelson and Mills 2001).    22 
 
or provides the additional income needed to self-insure.  Finally, in Panel IV, we 
see no effect on women who were working full-time in the previous year.  They 
neither leave the labor market nor change their labor force participation.  These 
results are highly consistent with the idea that married women value health 
insurance and seek out their own employer-provided health insurance or seek 
greater income in order to pay for potential medical expenses once their husbands 
are offered publicly provided health insurance. 
Table 7 provides various robustness checks.  In our base specification, 
we included all wives over the age of 18 in our sample.  However, women of 
younger ages may have different labor market attachment than older women.  
Panel I provides results limiting to middle-aged and older wives.  When wife ages 
are limited to 45-64, the percentage point magnitude of the results for not working 
and hours worked outcomes is very similar to that in the main specification in 
Table 3.  Limiting women to the same ages as the men in the sample, age 55-64 
provides larger magnitude results than our earlier sample.  In this case, women 
decrease not working by 3.4 ppt and increase hours worked by 1.12, about twice 
the magnitude as our base regression. 
In Panel II of Table 7, we explore outcomes for wives whose husbands 
are working part time or are not working. Our main results in Table 3 include all 
wives regardless of their husbands’ labor force attachment because the timing of 23 
 
labor supply changes within couples may vary upon the husbands’ public 
insurance receipt. Some husbands with employer-provided insurance may 
continue full-time work in spite of the availability of VA insurance, with the 
expectation that they will reduce their labor supply once their wives are able to 
find an alternate source of insurance (i.e the wife might change her labor supply 
before or at the same time as the husband).  Nevertheless, we may expect to see 
stronger results for couples in which the husband is either not working full-time 
or is not working at all, as these are couples for whom the offer is more likely to 
have had a direct effect (i.e. for whom the VA coverage potentially caused a 
decrease in the husband’s labor supply).  Panel II does demonstrate results with 
larger magnitudes for these two groups.  Wives of husbands who are not working 
full time are more likely to work and work about 1.37 more hours per week after 
public health insurance is offered to their husbands.  Similarly, wives of husbands 
who are not working at all are even more likely to work (decrease of not working 
of 4.3 ppt) and increase their hours worked by 1.76 hours per week. 
Panel III provides additional robustness checks.  Columns (1) and (2) 
demonstrate that fully interacting the independent variables in the model with 
veteran provides results similar to the base regression.  Columns (3) and (4) 
demonstrate the same for removing the year 2002 (when diabetic Vietnam 
veterans potentially exposed to Agent Orange were re-categorized as having 
work-related injuries).    24 
 
V.  Discussion and Conclusion 
In conclusion, when an older husband obtains public health insurance 
that does not cover his family members, less-educated wives increase their labor 
supply.  Wives with a high school education or less increase their labor supply 3 
percentage points, a 6% increase.  These less educated women also work 0.6-0.8 
more hours per week after the policy change.  We find no statistically significant 
change  in  probability  of  work  for  wives  with  higher  levels  of  education.  
Conditional  on  non-zero  earnings,  real  earnings  increase  for  all  wives  in  this 
sample, and the effect is potentially larger for wives with some college education 
or more. 
Results also differ by access to employer-provided health insurance in the 
previous year.  Women without this health insurance increase their hours to a 
greater extent than women with this insurance in the previous year once their 
husbands are offered health insurance.  Although all women on average increase 
their full-time work and their labor force participation, women who were not 
working in the previous year are more likely to enter the labor force to participate 
in part-time work or self-employment.  Women who worked part-time in the 
previous year are more likely to increase their hours to full-time work.  Women 
who previously worked full-time do not seem to be as affected by their husband’s 
access to publicly provided health insurance.  These results suggest that women in 25 
 
“career” jobs either cannot or will not adjust their own work behavior compared 
to women in more flexible employment. 
Our  results  are  robust  to  several  different  specifications,  including 
different choices of age, different year universes, and a full-veteran interaction.  
In  addition,  results  seem  to  be  stronger  for  women  whose  husbands  are  not 
working full-time or are not working at all. 
We hypothesize that these changes occur because, as found in Boyle 
and Lahey (2010), when older men obtain health insurance not linked to their 
employment, they are more likely to leave the full-time for-an-employer labor 
force, and are thus less likely to be able to provide employer-based insurance to 
their families.  In addition, older men in career jobs are more likely to have a 
choice between working full-time or not working, whereas women of the same 
cohort  are  more  likely  to  be  able  to  provide  income  from  more  flexible 
employment.  Thus, in order to reach a target income or to provide family health 
insurance or to self-insure medical expenses, women with a high school education 
or less increase their labor supply.  This effect comes from both women with less 
education increasing their labor force participation and from these women being 
less  likely  to  leave  the  labor  force.    We  do  not  find  any  evidence  of  work 
reductions based on complementarity of spousal leisure. 
These  results  differ  from  the  results  on  retiree  health  insurance  or 
COBRA, which found a joint retirement effect for these insurances.  However, the 26 
 
policy change is also different than that of coverage that includes the entire family 
rather  than  just  a  spouse.    Women,  who  are  on  average  not  yet  eligible  for 
Medicare when their spouses become eligible (because men are, on average, older 
than their wives), will likely need to continue working in order to be able to cover 
the costs for their own health insurance or health care even after the spouse has 
retired.  This need will be especially true for less-educated women, who are less 
likely to have access to employer-based retiree coverage of their own. 
This research suggests that although men’s labor force participation would 
decrease as an effect of increased public health insurance coverage, some of this 
decrease in participation would be made up for by an increase in the labor force 
participation and hours worked of their wives.   27 
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               Table 2 
 Effect of Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply Outcomes for Veterans 
   Not Working     Part Time     Self Employed 
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6) 
 
Panel I:  Effects of Insurance Receipt 
veteran*post  0.0058  0.0082* 
 
0.0160**  0.0155** 
 
-0.002  -0.0015 
 
(0.0051)  (0.0035) 
 
(0.0051)  (0.0050) 
 
(0.0043)  (0.0046) 
veteran  0.0164**  0.0311** 
 
-0.0018  0.0038 
 
-0.0350**  -0.0239** 
 
(0.0039)  (0.0027) 
 
(0.0038)  (0.0038) 
 
(0.0040)  (0.0045) 
Observations  41,440  41,440     26,605  26,605     41,440  41,440 
 
Panel II:  Falsification exercise:  1992-1993 = pre, 1994-1995 = post 
veteran*fakepost  -0.0145  -0.0067 
 
0.0078  0.0048 
 
0.0100  0.0078 
 
(0.0079)  (0.0042) 
 
(0.0080)  (0.0070) 
 
(0.0070)  (0.0085) 
veteran  0.0255**  0.0359** 
 
-0.0053  0.0017 
 
-0.0394**  -0.0275** 
 
(0.0068)  (0.0041) 
 
(0.0034)  (0.0039) 
 
(0.0050)  (0.0061) 
                  Full controls?  No  Yes 
 
No  Yes 
 
No  Yes 
State time trend?  No  Yes 
 
No  Yes 
 
No  Yes 
Observations  18,722  18,722     11,591  11,591     18,722  18,722 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are taken from a probit regression as described in eq. (1).   Marginal effects are reported.  Regressions include age, race, 
state, year and education dummies and  a constant.  Full controls include pension and health insurance receipt in the previous year for columns (1) and 
(2) and current year in columns (3)-(6).  The universe in Panel I includes the years 1992-2002 with 1996 and 1997 omitted.  The universe in Panel II 
includes years 1992-1995, with fakepost indicating the years 1994-1995.  Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year.    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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III. Wives with Some College or More Education 


















































                     
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       Table 4 
Effect of Husband's Insurance on Wife's Outcomes 
 











   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4) 
 
I.  All Wives 
veteran*post  0.0325  -1.4348 
 
0.0634*  0.0783** 
 
(1.2325)  (1.7571) 
 
(0.0287)  (0.0256) 
veteran  4.5865**  3.1662* 
 
0.0344  -0.0076 
 
(1.2617)  (1.4128) 
 
(0.0249)  (0.0213) 
            Observations  9,768  9,768 
 
4,738  4,738 
 
II.  Wives with High School Education or Less Education 
veteran*post  -2.1316  -3.4454 
 
0.0805*  0.0878** 
 
(3.2904)  (3.7608) 
 
(0.0400)  (0.0329) 
veteran  1.9817  1.6011 
 
0.0427  0.0032 
 
(1.3003)  (1.6235) 
 
(0.0361)  (0.0283) 
            Observations  5,775  5,775 
 
2,428  2,428 
 
III. Wives with Some College or More Education 
veteran*post  4.9758  4.6600 
 
0.1072+  0.1604** 
 
(3.7273)  (4.1977) 
 
(0.0571)  (0.0474) 
veteran  1.1148  -0.9412 
 
-0.0338  -0.0917** 
 
(2.3850)  (2.3538) 
 
(0.0313)  (0.0293) 




         
           
           
           
           
           
           
           Table 5 
Results by Wife's Health Insurance Receipt 
  
Wife Had Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance  
 
Wife Without Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance  
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4) 
 
Panel I:  Work outcomes 
           
 
Not Working  Part Time 
 
Not Working  Part Time 
veteran*post  -0.0216**  0.0181* 
 
-0.0140  -0.0407** 
 
(0.0062)  (0.0076) 
 
(0.0089)  (0.0151) 
veteran  0.0249**  -0.0147* 
 
0.0152*  0.0103 
 
(0.0035)  (0.0058) 
 
(0.0063)  (0.0120) 
Sig different? 
     
Yes  Yes 
Observations  14,063  11,044     26,532  11,465 
   Panel II:  Hours Outcomes 
 
        
   
 
Hrs Worked  Hrs Worked|hrs>0 
 
Hrs Worked  Hrs Worked|hrs>0 
veteran*post  0.3765  -0.5850* 
 
0.7653**  1.0810* 
 
(0.3853)  (0.2279) 
 
(0.2487)  (0.4673) 
veteran  -0.5319+  0.4188* 
 
-0.5718**  -0.4936 
 
(0.2922)  (0.1811) 
 
(0.1349)  (0.3564) 
       
Yes  Yes 
Observations  14,129  11,083     26,573  10,791 
   Panel III:  Earnings Outcomes 
           
 
Earnings  ln(Earnings) 
 
Earnings  ln(Earnings) 
veteran*post  3.1239  -0.0300 
 
0.2210  0.2244** 
 
(5.6723)  (0.0245) 
 
(3.1185)  (0.0521) 
veteran  0.5759  0.0699** 
 
2.4344  -0.0892* 
 
(4.2682)  (0.0174) 
 
(1.5601)  (0.0357) 
       
No  Yes 




         
           
           
           
           
           Table 6 
Pathways:  Multinomial Logits 
 









I.  All Wives 
veteran*post  0.0184**  -0.0009  0.0020  -0.0195** 
 
(0.0069)     (0.0036)     (0.0040)     (0.0068)    
veteran  -0.0003  -0.0027  -0.0144**  0.0174** 
 
(0.0042)     (0.0033)     (0.0030)     (0.0046)    
          Observations  39,526  39,526  39,526  39,526 
   II.  Wives who Worked 0 Weeks Last Year 
veteran*post  -0.0009+  0.0037*  0.0034*  -0.0061** 
 
(0.0005)     (0.0017)      (0.0014)      (0.0022)    
veteran  -0.00002  -0.0026*  -0.0034**  0.0061** 
 
(0.0006)     (0.0011)     (0.0007)    (0.0015)    
          Observations  15,028  15,028  15,028  15,028 
   III.  Wives who Worked Part-Time Last Year 
veteran*post  0.0388*  -0.0319*  -0.0074  0.0006 
 
(0.0153)     (0.0200)     (0.0184)     (0.0102)     
veteran 
-
0.0369**  0.0391**  -0.0066  0.0044 
 
(0.0045)    (0.0070)      (0.0172)     (0.0097)     
          Observations  5,081  5,081  5,081  5,081 
   IV.  Wives who Worked Full-Time Last Year 
veteran*post  -0.0060  -0.0036  0.0057  0.0038 
 
(0.0046)    (0.0028)    (0.0038)    (0.0038)     
veteran  0.0244**  0.0005  -0.0228**  -0.0022 
 
(0.0025)     (0.0023)      (0.0025)    (0.0029)    
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          Table 7 
Robustness Checks 
 
(1)  (2) 
 
(3)  (4) 
 
Not 
Working  Hours Worked 
 
Not 
Working  Hours Worked 





veteran*post  -0.0160*  0.7803** 
 
-0.0337**  1.1243* 
 
(0.0074)  (0.2506) 
 
(0.0082)  (0.4260) 
veteran  0.0164**  -0.5570** 
 
0.0310**  -0.9898* 
 
(0.0053)  (0.1329) 
 
(0.0073)  (0.3626) 
            Observations  36,762  36,762     23,314  23,314 
   Panel II: Limiting Husbands 
 
Husband Not Working Full-
Time 
 
Husband Not Working 
veteran*post  -0.0353**  1.3721** 
 
-0.0430**  1.7639** 
 
(0.0057)  (0.2106) 
 
(0.0095)  (0.2712) 
veteran  0.0159**  -0.3735** 
 
0.0055  -0.5967** 
 
(0.0048)  (0.1142) 
 
(0.0080)  (0.1939) 
            Observations  23,732  23,774     12,751  12,827 
   Panel III: Additional Checks 
           
 
Full veteran interaction 
 
No 2002 
veteran*post  -0.0200**  0.6017* 
 
-0.0263**  0.9216** 
 
(0.0070)  (0.2296) 
 
(0.0059)  (0.1562) 
veteran  ---  --- 
 
0.0155**  -0.4478** 
       
(0.0046)  (0.1287) 




         
           
           
           
           
           
             